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JUDGES AS HONEST AGENTS
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK*

I'm here to defend the proposition that, when implementing
statutes, judges should be honest agents of the enacting legislature.
The honest-agent part is not controversial. It isn't just that
Hamilton said in The Federalist that judges would play this
role.1 It is that faithful application of statutes is part of our heritage from the United Kingdom, and thus what the phrase "the
judicial Power" in Article III means.
Constitutional structure tells us the same thing. The President must take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Judges,
who are not elected, cannot have a power to depart from faithful implementation, when the elected officials are lashed to the
statute. It would be insane to give revisionary powers to people
you can't turn out of office. The trade in Article III is simple:
Judges get tenure in exchange for promising to carry out federal laws. Tenure is designed to make judges more faithful to
statutes, rather than to liberate them from statutes. It liberates
them from today's public opinion, so that they can be faithful
to yesterday's rules (whether in the Constitution or in the
United States Code).
So the real question at hand is the second part of the proposition: must the judge be faithful to the enacting legislature or instead to the sitting one, as Professor Eskridge argues?2 Or perhaps should the judge be more faithful to later-enacted statutes,
and treat earlier ones as if they were part of the common rather
than the statutory law? That's the position Judge Calabresi took
in 1982,3 although he spoke as a professor and perhaps has come
to see matters otherwise after joining the bench.

* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The Law School, The University of Chicago. @2010 by Frank H. Easterbrook.
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
3. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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I think that the judge must carry out the policy created by the
enacting Congress, even if later laws are in tension with the
older ones, and even if the judge is convinced that the sitting
Congress would amend the law were it to visit the subject
anew. I have three principal reasons.4
First, our Constitution makes certain procedures essential
to enacting law. Congress must act by majority vote. Both
Houses must enact the same text during the same Congress.
And the President must give assent unless two-thirds of each
House votes to override a veto. The terms of political officials are limited to two, four, or six years, after which they
must face the people. A judge cannot conceive of legislators
as homunculi who have perpetual tenure and always can
revise their work. Only what officials do during their terms
counts as law -and then only to the extent that what they do
meets the forms of bicameral and presidential agreement. An
opinion poll of legislators is not law, because it does not satisfy the forms, even if the judge is sure that the poll reflects
what legislators favor. And thus only the actual work of an
actual enacting legislature counts. That legislators serving at
different times produce different rules is an attribute of a
democratic system, not an objection to it or a reason for
judges to become legal entrepreneurs.
The Supreme Court made this point in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.5 Plaintiffs won a civil rights suit and
asked the court to award them not only attorneys' fees, but also
the fees they paid to expert witnesses. Although the statute,
enacted in 1871, covers only attorneys' fees, more recent statutes allow the award of expert fees too. The winner expressed
confidence that, if Congress considered the issue either in 1871
or today, it would include expert fees. But the Justices thought
the exercise illegitimate-not wrong in the sense that the litigant had misunderstood the likely behavior of the legislative

4. I develop these reasons elsewhere at greater length. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 349 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation,57 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 61 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998).

5. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
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branch, but wrong in the sense that judges are not authorized
to engage in the exercise. Here's what the Court said:
This argument profoundly mistakes our role. Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we
construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits
most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law. We do so not because
that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers
must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress
know what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is
our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus
juris. But where, as here, the meaning of the term prevents
such accommodation, it is not our function to eliminate
clearly expressed inconsistency of policy and to treat alike
subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently. The facile attribution of congressional "forgetfulness" cannot justify such a usurpation. Where what is at issue is not a contradictory disposition within the same
enactment, but merely a difference between the more parsimonious policy of an earlier enactment and the more generous policy of a later one, there is no more basis for saying
that the earlier Congress forgot than for saying that the earlier Congress felt differently. In such circumstances, the attribution of forgetfulness rests in reality upon the judge's assessment that the later statute contains the better disposition.
But that is not for judges to prescribe. We thus reject this last
argument for the same reason that Justice Brandeis, writing
for the Court, once rejected a similar (though less explicit)
argument by the United States: "[The statute's] language is
plain and unambiguous. What the Government asks is not a
construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it
by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the judicial function." 6
In a footnote to this paragraph, the Court added:
[The litigants] at least ask[] us to guess the preferences of the
enacting Congress. Justice Stevens apparently believes our
role is to guess the desires of the present Congress, or of Congresses yet to be. "Only time will tell," he says, "whether the
Court, with its literal reading of § 1988, has correctly interpreted the will of Congress." The implication is that today's
holding will be proved wrong if Congress amends the law to
6. Id. at 100-01 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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conform with his dissent. We think not. The "will of Congress" we look to is not a will evolving from Session to Session, but a will expressed and fixed in a particular enactment. Otherwise, we would speak not of "interpreting" the
law but of "intuiting" or "predicting" it. Our role is to say
what the law, as hitherto enacted, is; not to forecast what the
law, as amended, will be.7
Second, limiting interpretation to the work of the enacting
Congress honors the reality that laws are enacted as packages.
Arguments that today's Congress would do X or Y or Z with a
given issue suppose that the legislature will act on just that issue, and that an opinion poll (or the report of the majority
party's whip) tells us what outcome a majority favors on that
issue. But if proposal Z has widespread support, someone will
add an amendment about a contentious subject in order to help
a less-favored proposal move. Think of the anti-abortion clause
that was tied to the proposal that eventually became the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005:
the clause tied the bill in knots for years and almost led to its
defeat.8 Suddenly things are not so clear in the legislature.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is another example. This statute
changed several provisions in civil rights laws that the Court
had construed favorably to employers,9 and that Justices in dissent were sure the legislature would overturn. 0 But it also
changed some decisions that had favored plaintiffs (such as
Albemarle Paper, which had allowed differential validation of
employment tests"), and it set caps on damages awards. The
pro-worker provisions could not have passed without the proemployer provisions. Any attempt by the judges to discern
what Congress would have done on one issue, standing alone,
would have misunderstood how legislation works, as well as
bypassed the Constitution's forms for lawmaking.
Third, judicial attempts to predict what Congress will do
come croppers more often than not. My favorite example is Illi7. Id. at 101 n.7 (citations omitted).
8. See William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 169-171.
9. See Theodore McMillian, The Civil Rights Act of 1991-One Step Forwardon a
Long Road, 22 STETSON L. REV. 69, 69 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 671-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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nois Brick Co. v. Illinois,12 which held that only direct purchasers
may sue under the antitrust laws. So if steel makers conspire,
the right plaintiffs are the immediate buyers, such as auto
manufacturers, rather than consumers who buy cars that contain steel. In his dissent, Justice Brennan predicted that Illinois
Brick would be short-lived, because Congress was sure to allow
indirect-purchaser suits.13 Like Justice Stevens in Casey,14 he
called on his colleagues to recognize that political reality and to
interpret the law to allow these suits without all the fuss and
muss of getting the amendment through Congress.' 5 The majority was unpersuaded. Here we are thirty-three years later,
and Congress has not allowed suits by indirect purchasers, despite persistent proposals.
Judges may be bad at understanding what can be enacted,
but they are good at understanding their own views of wise
policy. When a judge says "I'm confident that today's Congress
will enact X," what this really means is "I favor X." But a
judge's preference for X is a bad reason to declare that X is the
law. Again we must remember that our Constitution's design is
to keep policymakers on short temporal leashes. Judges don't
stand for election, and it follows that they can't adopt their
own legislative proposals.
What I have said about using the sitting Congress as the basis for interpreting older statutes also goes for the method of
imaginative reconstruction-that is, asking what the enacting
congress would have done about something, had it thought
about the topic. Such an approach ignores the package-deal
nature of legislation. And if judges are bad at predicting what
today's Congress would do about a topic, think how awful they
12. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
13. See id. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court's tortuous efforts to impose a 'consistency' upon this area of the law that Congress has so clearly rejected
is a return to the 'legal somersaults and twistings and turnings' of the Court's
earlier opinions that ultimately led to the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914 to
salvage the ailing Sherman Act.").
14. See W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It
obviously has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose
and require it 'to take the time to revisit the matter' and to restate its purpose in
more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error." (citation omitted)).
15. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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would be at estimating how people who died fifty years ago
would have handled a topic.
My example is Logan v. United States.16 The issue was
whether a misdemeanor under state law counts as a violent
felony for purposes of a federal recidivist enhancement to a
criminal sentence. Ah, now there's an issue only a lawyer could
love! Federal law defines a "felony" as any conviction for which
the maximum sentence exceeds one year, 7 while Wisconsin authorized up to three years in prison for domestic battery at the
time. 8 So the state misdemeanor is a federal felony-unless a person's civil rights have been restored. The federal statute excludes
from the definition of "conviction" any offense that "has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or
has had civil rights restored ... unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms."19
Now things get interesting. Wisconsin strips felons of their
right to hold office, vote, and serve on juries, 20 so at least in
principle those rights may be "restored" and the state conviction no longer count as a felony for federal purposes. But persons convicted of misdemeanors in Wisconsin do not lose any
civil rights, 2 1 so they can't be restored. This creates the possibility that state misdemeanor convictions will lead to longer terms
in federal prison than state felony convictions.
The Second Circuit said that the statute is clear: rights cannot
be "restored" if they have never been taken away. 2 The First
Circuit agreed that this is the natural reading of the word but
added that Congress could not possibly have considered the

16. 453 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006), aff'd, 552 U.S. 23 (2007).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 9 22 (g)(1) (2006).
18. In the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the Seventh Circuit, the Court explained that "[u]nder Wisconsin law, misdemeanor battery is ordinarily punishable by a maximum term of nine months. See Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) (2005);
§ 939.51(3). Logan was exposed to a three-year maximum term for each offense,
however, because he was convicted as a 'repeater' or 'habitual' criminal." Logan,
552 U.S. at 29 n.2 (citations omitted).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006).
20. WIs. CONST. art. XIII, § 3, cl. 2; WiS. STAT. § 6.03(1)(b) (Supp. 2006); WIs.
STAT. § 756.02 (2001).
21. Logan, 552 U.S. at 31.
22. See McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1006-08 (2d Cir. 1995).
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question at hand, because the result is weird.23 Why treat the
less serious state crime as the basis of a longer federal sentence?
Some judges might have called the law "absurd," but the First
Circuit had none of that. It agreed with the textualist position
that the absurdity doctrine should be limited to linguistic problems; otherwise the judiciary can assume too much power by
waving its hand and declaring "absurdity" whenever the law
produces an unpleasant result.
But although the law is not absurd, it also shows no sign of
legislative attention to the issues that can arise when a state
deems a crime so slight that it does not take away the accused's
civil rights even for a day. How would a sensible legislature
have handled such a problem, the First Circuit wondered. It
was confident that Congress would have equated the situations
of persons who never lost their civil rights to those who lost
their rights and had them restored. So the First Circuit ruled in
the defendant's favor.
When the question came to the Seventh Circuit in Logan, we
disagreed with the First Circuit, because the genesis of the
imaginative-reconstruction approach is in private litigationcontracts rather than public law. In his book on jurisprudence,
Judge Posner urges us to treat a statutory gap just like a garbled command to a secretary ("cancel today's lunch date with
X," when the calendar shows that the date is with Y), or to a
platoon leader ("Go [static]."). 24 Everyone can tell that action is
essential, but what action? The secretary or platoon leader had
best make a quick choice, and in neither case is literal compliance appropriate.
A good secretary or sergeant avoids empty-headed literalism. We hire agents for their expertise and judgment as well as
for their ability to follow orders; good agents know when to
deviate from a command in order to achieve more of the principal's objective. Still, it does not follow that courts ought to
treat legislation the way secretaries treat scheduling. Examples
concerning secretaries, soldiers, and the like have several things
in common: they posit a single living principal, a single agent, a
single maximand. None of these hold true when the time comes
to interpret statutes.
23. See United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627, 629-31 (1st Cir. 1996).
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 268-69 (1990).
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Statutes are drafted by multiple persons, often with conflicting
objectives. There will not be a single objective, and discretionary
interpretation favors some members of the winning coalition
over others. (Maybe it favors the losers!) An agent's hands are
more closely tied when the principal names a means without
having a clear objective. Moreover, the parallel to a private
agent such as the secretary supposes an ongoing relation, one
in which discretion by the agent best serves the principal's current objectives. With legislation, the "principal" is not the sitting Congress but the enacting one (or perhaps the polity as a
whole). This situation brings into play the many rules that tie
the hands of those principals-and perforce of their agents, as
it is difficult to give a constitutional theory that endows the judiciary with greater legislative discretion than Congress possesses. Legislators cannot create laws without satisfying constitutional requirements (bicameral approval and the like), plus
internal requirements (consideration by committees, and so
on). The drafters go out of office and lose the ability to update
their decisions; the current legislature may update or be passive (and passivity may stem from still more procedural obstacles rather than agreement with the rules in place).
Still more differences separate the legislature-judge relation
from the common principal-agent one. Laws are designed to
control the conduct of strangers to the transactions, not just of
the judges. Rules must be publicized to be effective (to be
"rules of law" at all). Addressees need predictability so they
may plan-for compliance, for the rearrangement of the rest of
their lives. Usually the addressees are not judges. They are
businesses or the executive branch of government. They may
be hostile to the constraints; their purposes diverge from the
legislators' objectives. If they do not obey, they are not fired (as
private agents may be); instead they are brought to court. If
addressees must be able to vary the commands in order to
fulfill their objectives, then undermining is likely too. Judges
too may be hostile to the commands, or may believe that the
supporters did not do "enough." Private agents acting on these
views would be discharged; judges have tenure.
My point is simple: an understanding of agency appropriate
to one-on-one transactions is not appropriate to the business of
writing and implementing statutes. And Logan also illustrates
the judicial difficulty in understanding what kind of proposals
Congress actually enacts.
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Section 922(g)(9) of the Criminal Code makes it unlawful for
anyone "who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to possess a firearm that is
connected with interstate commerce.25 This Section has a definitional provision corresponding to Section 921(a)(20). That provision, Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), reads:
A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of
such an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction
has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which
the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for
the loss of civil rights under such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly
provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or
receive firearms. 26
This provision tracks Section 921 (a)(20) in treating expungement,
pardon, or restoration of civil rights as canceling all effect of the
conviction-but it shows that the "restoration of civil rights"
clause is inapplicable to one whose civil rights were never taken
away. For such persons, expungement and pardon are the only
ways to regain the right to possess firearms. In other words,
when Congress addressed this subject directly, it supported the
Second Circuit's conclusion, not the First Circuit's.
So Logan posed some fascinating issues. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court did not address any of them. It affirmed my
decision in an opinion stating that the statute had an obvious
meaning and must be enforced as written. Perhaps this statement shows the Court's impatience with scholarly debate; the
comforting thing is that it also shows reluctance to engage in
the imaginative-reconstruction exercise.

25. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)( 9 ) (2006).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii) (2006).
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